Missed claims: what it costs a construction contractor

What it is. 10.6% of original contract value, client-approved change orders.

Sample. 67 completed public infrastructure projects from one contractor, Australia, civil, 2011-2014. Change orders totalled about AU$342m against about AU$3.2bn of original contract value, so 10.6% is a total over a total (the paper calls it a mean: average change orders of about AU$5.1m over average contract value of about AU$48.2m).

What it is not. SIZE OF THE POT, NOT A LOSS. No study measures how much of it a typical contractor fails to claim. Change orders were linked to HIGHER contractor margins, which is the opposite of a loss.

Where it came from

• Love, Irani, Smith, Regan & Liu (2017), Cost Performance of Public Infrastructure Projects: The Nemesis and Nirvana of Change-Orders · free copy
  Table 2; accepted manuscript, Change-Orders section · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'variations' is now the registers' cause 'unclaimed_variations' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)

forfeited_entitlements/entitlement_variations_pot · AU · F42 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. 36.9% of the total amount claimed across 246 adjudication decisions: claims the adjudicator could not decide at all.

Sample. 246 published Queensland adjudication decisions, March 2022 to August 2023; 66 (26.8%) were no-jurisdiction decisions.

What it is not. A nominating authority's own count of published decisions, not the regulator's statistics. A no-jurisdiction decision means the claim failed on procedure, such as timing or form, not on its merits, and the claimant may have other routes to recover, so this is money put at risk by procedure rather than a proven loss.

Our arithmetic. $70,119,333.18 claimed in no-jurisdiction decisions / $189,905,327.50 claimed across all 246 decisions = 0.3692 (the author calls it 'almost 37%').

Where it came from

• Adjudicate Today (2023), What is happening under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017 QLD?
  article body, the author's tally of 246 Queensland decisions · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'payment' is now the registers' cause 'unpaid_claims' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)

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What it is. 9% of the cost of the projects examined: over A$127 million in contract variations.

Sample. The Queensland Government infrastructure projects (mostly schools and public buildings) examined in QAO Report 16: 2021-22. One project, Fortitude Valley State Secondary College, reached 21.5% of its original contract value.

What it is not. A handful of audited building projects, not a sample of Queensland civil work. The denominator is total project cost, not the original contract value. Variations are money the client agreed to pay, the size of the pot, not a contractor loss. Corroborates the 10.6% change-order figure (67 Australian projects) from a Queensland regulator.

Where it came from

• Queensland Audit Office (2022), Contract management for new infrastructure (Report 16: 2021-22) · free copy
  'Audit conclusions'; definition of contract variation under 'Are contract variations effectively managed?' · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'variations' is now the registers' cause 'unclaimed_variations' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)

forfeited_entitlements/entitlement_variations_qld_public · AU-QLD · F41 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. AUD per claim: the average dollar amount of the claimant's most recent claim under security of payment law, as reported by contractors who had made one.

Sample. Survey of 526 construction contractors in all states and territories (46.8% Queensland, 30.8% Western Australia, 17.9% New South Wales), commissioned for the 2017 review. Only 23% had ever made a security of payment claim, and the report does not state how many answered the claim-amount question. 25% of claimants in the last two years said their claim was between $100 001 and $500 000; 60% said the claim was against a head contractor.

What it is not. A claim amount is money claimed because it was unpaid or disputed, not money lost: some is later paid or adjudicated in part. A mean of self-reported amounts from a convenience survey, not a count of claims: 73% of respondents were in firms of 20 or fewer people, 45% were electrical contractors, and civil contractors are a minority, and 96% of respondents came from Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales, so the other states and territories are barely represented. Never multiplied by a contract value.

Where it came from

• J Murray AM, for the Australian Government (Department of Jobs and Small Business) (2017), Review of Security of Payment Laws: Building Trust and Harmony
  Appendix B, 'Security of payment laws and claims made', p.324 · source record

forfeited_entitlements/payment_sop_average_claim_au · AU · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. AUD per project: liquidated damages applied for late Practical Completion ($1.3 million, May to December 2010) plus late Final Acceptance ($5.2 million, December 2014 to April 2015), on a fixed-price contract valued at $263 million (about 2.5% of that contract value).

Sample. Defence's design-and-construct contract with Lend Lease for the Mulwala propellant plant (signed 8 June 2007, fixed price, $263 million). Practical Completion was due in March 2010 (33 months, paragraphs 3.2 and 3.10; Box 2 prints the Deed 1 starting date as March 2009, which the report's own text contradicts) and was moved to February 2011 by the first deed; Final Acceptance, contracted for June 2011, was granted on 30 April 2015, nearly four years late (paragraph 3.3), and the last major defect is not expected to be rectified until August 2016, more than five years after the contracted date. Defence kept $1.3 million of $1.8 million accrued in the first period and deducted $5.2 million accrued in the second from a $9.4 million payment due at Final Acceptance.

What it is not. One Commonwealth defence-industrial project (New South Wales), selected by an audit because it failed, so it is the damages that were applied on a project whose Final Acceptance came nearly four years late (and whose last major defect fell more than five years after the contracted date), not a typical rate. It is a figure for what was applied and deducted, not for time owed and never claimed: the report records that the contractor sought extensions of time among its claims (paragraph 3.10) and that the deeds moved the completion dates, so the days charged were those left after that settlement. The two amounts are GST exclusive and are not adjusted for inflation (the $1.3 million is 2010 money and the $5.2 million 2015 money, added as published; price_year is the year of the larger amount), and the 2.5% is against the original $263 million contract value, which the deeds later changed. Table 3.1 of the same report shows liquidated damages paid as $7 million against $6.5 million here; the box note is used because it states each period. Not a figure for Australia-wide practice, so it is filed under NSW and does not fill the national cell.

Our arithmetic. 1.3 + 5.2 = 6.5 ($ million, the two amounts in Box 2 Note b). 6.5 / 263 = 0.0247, about 2.5% of the $263 million contract in paragraph 3.1. The share is given only here, in words, and is not filed as a ratio_of_contract: it is one project and the product would multiply it by every NSW job.

Where it came from

• Australian National Audit Office (2016), Defence's Management of the Mulwala Propellant Facility (Auditor-General Report No. 26 of 2015-16)
  Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 and 3.10; Box 2 Note b; Table 3.1 · source record

forfeited_entitlements/penalty_days_liquidated_damages_levied_mulwala_nsw · AU-NSW · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - nine Australian sources opened, none measures prolongation, standby or extended-preliminaries money that went unclaimed after time was granted.

Sample. Search terms: extension of time claims liquidated damages Australian construction empirical; delay cost prolongation claims percentage Australia; delay costs recovery survey Australian contractors; unrecovered costs claims per cent of contract value Australia; Australian Constructors Association contract risk survey; Arcadis construction disputes Australia causes. The nearest measure is time-related site overhead: 30 Australian estimators put 45.49% of preliminaries as time-related for the whole job (Table 6), and preliminaries at 10% to 20% of the contract sum (UK 2002, second-hand); the corpus holds the resulting per-day worked example in this cause as weather_wet_day_overhead, and the share-of-contract arithmetic as a `none` record, weather_unclaimed_days_share_of_contract (both moved here from penalty_days on review): calculations, not measurements of money left unclaimed. Not counted because it would not open: HKA Crux 2025 (global, page without figures), Austlii judgments (403).

What it is not. Recorded as `none` on purpose. The time-related overhead share says what a delay day costs in principle, not how many such days go unclaimed once time is granted, which no source we could open measures.

Where it came from

• O'Leary & Vaz-Serra (2025), Challenges in pricing preliminaries costs for contractors: An Australian case study
  introduction citing Chan & Pasquire 2002; table 6 (30 Australian estimators) · source record

Considered and set aside

• Transport for NSW: Clause 43 pays wet-weather delay costs only above a nominated threshold of days, and the guide note sets the rate at 50% of the site-overhead rate: a contract rule from one agency, not a measure of what contractors fail to claim.
• Infrastructure Australia: Says contractor claims are growing and cites delay-driven disputes, with no count or dollar figure for delay costs claimed or missed.
• Hasib & Al-Kilidar (University of Technology Sydney): Ranks causes of delay by perceived importance (28 respondents); measures no cost and no claim outcome.
• Arcadis with the Australian Constructors Association: Costs absorbed after contractual mitigation including extensions of time, but only for market price escalation, with no respondent count and no values printed on the chart.
• Love, Zhou, Edwards, Irani & Sing: 16 rail projects; reports cost increases by scope change and mentions delays only as background, with no delay-cost measure.
• Love, Irani, Smith, Regan & Liu: 67 projects' change orders in total; no extension-of-time or prolongation category.
• Terrill, Coates & Danks (Grattan Institute): 836 transport projects' overruns from announcement, owner-side and not split by cause.
• Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts: $32.8bn of known cost pressures and delivery delays across the federal pipeline, not split by cause; government money.
• Queensland Parliament, Minister for Transport and Main Roads: Net variations in contract scope, cost or time across Queensland road contracts, with no separation of delay costs; Queensland only.

forfeited_entitlements/delay_costs_none_au · AU · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - eight Australian sources opened, none measures latent-condition claims or their cost as a share of contract value, a cost per claim, or the share rejected for lack of notice.

Sample. Search terms: latent conditions claims Australia cost share of contract value; differing site conditions variations percentage; ground risk cost infrastructure Australia; latent conditions time bar notice empirical study; ANAO contract variations latent conditions; Austroads variations by cause; Australian Constructors Association risk allocation survey; underground utility strikes cost Australia. Frequencies found, none a cost: in the Infrastructure Australia market sounding survey 44% of government and 38% of private executives said latent ground risk should be shared and 8% of government executives said the private sector should bear it (Section 4.9, p.47). Sources that could not be opened and so are not counted: a Queensland TMR road-variations thesis (Purvis 2015, host unreachable), the Before You Dig Australia 2024 utility-strike assessment (403), Austlii judgments (403).

What it is not. Recorded as `none` on purpose. No source we could open reports how often latent-condition claims are made, how many fail for lack of notice, or what ground risk costs as a share of contract value. The Sydney CBD Light Rail overrun (about $1bn, about 50% of project value, Infrastructure Australia Section 4.7) is one contested NSW project driven mainly by utilities and is owner-side, so it is not filed as a figure.

Where it came from

• Infrastructure Australia (2021), A National Study of Infrastructure Risk
  Section 4.2 and Figures 5 and 6 (who should bear latent geotechnical risk); Section 4.7 (utilities and relocation risk); Section 4.9 'Unpredictable ground conditions', p.47 and Figure 28 · source record

Considered and set aside

• Love, Zhou, Edwards, Irani & Sing: 16 Australian rail projects by one contractor; scope changes drove the cost increase and the text names underground-utility relocation as a cause, but gives no latent-condition cost or share.
• Love, Irani, Smith, Regan & Liu: 67 public infrastructure projects; change orders of 10.6% of contract value are reported in total. The paper says analysing the nature of change orders is outside its remit and observes only that scope changes and documentation errors predominated, so there is no latent-condition category.
• Terrill, Coates & Danks (Grattan Institute): 836-project national overrun dataset measured from the first announced cost; owner-side money and no split by cause, so ground conditions cannot be isolated.
• Queensland Parliament, Minister for Transport and Main Roads: Names latent conditions among reasons for variations on Queensland road contracts and gives net variations in total ($753.7m on $8.87bn awarded); no split by reason, and Queensland only.
• Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts: $32.8bn of known cost pressures across the federal pipeline, not split by cause and not independently verified by the review; government money.
• Arcadis with the Australian Constructors Association: Contractors' absorbed market price escalation after variations and extensions of time; a perception survey on prices, not ground conditions, with no respondent count.
• Hasib & Al-Kilidar (University of Technology Sydney): 28 respondents ranking 59 delay causes; ground conditions were not among the causes surveyed and no cost is measured.
• Transport for NSW: Transport for NSW's general requirements for major civil contracts; a search of its full text found no latent-condition clause or rate, and it holds contract terms, not outcomes.

forfeited_entitlements/latent_conditions_none_au · AU · F42 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. AUD per insolvent construction company: the lowest-band estimate of liabilities over assets for all its creditors (unsecured trade creditors and subcontractors among them), averaged over the 2,153 insolvencies.

Sample. All 2,153 construction-industry initial external administrators' reports in 2013-14. The committee's own total is a floor; the CFMEU's median-based estimate is $2.70 billion, or about $1.26 million per insolvency (also a division by 2,153). 1,974 of the 2,153 (91.7%) paid unsecured creditors zero cents in the dollar (Table 3.4).

What it is not. Losses of ALL creditors, including banks, the tax office and employees, not of subcontractors alone, and of insolvent companies, not of a typical job. An estimate lodged at the start of each administration (liabilities over assets), not a realised loss or a recovery outcome. A lower-bound mean from band minimums, so it understates the 67 insolvencies above $10 million, which Table 3.1 counts at their $10 million floor; and the mean is pulled up by those large cases (981 of the 2,153 reports, 45.6%, show a deficiency under $250,000), so it is not a typical company's shortfall. 2013-14 data; ASIC publishes later years that this research pass did not open. Not a share of contract value, so never multiplied by one.

Our arithmetic. Table 3.1 total estimated deficiency (minimum) $1,625 million, built by taking the lowest dollar figure in each of seven deficiency bands, divided by the 2,153 reports: 1,625,000,000 / 2,153 = 754,761, shown as 755,000 because the table is rounded to $ million.

Where it came from

• Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia (2015), Insolvency in the Australian construction industry ("I just want to be paid"), Chapter 3: The impact of insolvency
  Chapter 3, Table 3.1 and paragraph 3.4 · source record

forfeited_entitlements/payment_construction_insolvency_shortfall_au · AU · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - ten Australian sources opened, none measures liquidated damages as a share of contract value or per day across a national sample of projects, or the share of extension-of-time claims refused or served late.

Sample. Search terms: liquidated damages levied Australia public infrastructure percentage of contract value; Auditor-General liquidated damages not applied delayed projects (NSW, Victoria, Queensland, WA, Commonwealth); extension of time claims time-barred notice empirical study Australia; Society of Construction Law Australia empirical delay claims; Productivity Commission public infrastructure liquidated damages; Melbourne Law School survey of contract amendments; Arcadis global construction disputes Australia delay claims. Amounts found, none national: Mulwala $6.5 million on $263 million (ANAO, filed under AU-NSW); Banksia Hill $209 000 (WA, no contract value). Frequencies and contract terms found, none a cost: Suburban Rail Loop tunnels cap liquidated damages at 10 per cent of target outturn cost (15 per cent by election); the Murray review (Chapter 15.5, retentions) reports head contractors citing liquidated damages to keep subcontractors' retention, and its Chapter 16.5 and 16.6 (unfair contract terms) records stakeholder and Society of Construction Law Australia views that time bars on extension-of-time claims often go beyond their legitimate purpose, in both cases with no count or amount. Not opened and so not counted: a Melbourne Law School survey of contract amendments that a search summary of a vendor page cited (not found at source), and the Arcadis and HKA global dispute reports, whose Australian cuts we did not find.

What it is not. Recorded as `none` on purpose. Liquidated damages are a contract term, and Australian audit offices report them only project by project, usually when a project failed. No source we could open reports how much is levied across a national sample, or how many extension-of-time claims are refused or time-barred. One project amount is filed under AU-NSW. Contract rates and caps (for example 10 per cent of target outturn cost) are terms, not outcomes, and are not filed.

Where it came from

• J Murray AM, for the Australian Government (Department of Jobs and Small Business) (2017), Review of Security of Payment Laws: Building Trust and Harmony
  Appendix B 'Survey of contractors', p.324 (claim amounts under security of payment laws); Chapter 3, p.14 (survey of 526 contractors); Chapter 6, p.64 (applications per year); Chapter 10, p.123 (latent conditions, time-related costs, disputed variations); Section 15.5, p.270 (retentions and bank guarantees) · source record

Considered and set aside

• Australian National Audit Office: The one place an audit states liquidated damages actually applied and the contract value: $6.5 million on a $263 million contract (Box 2 Note b, paragraph 3.1). It is one troubled Commonwealth project in New South Wales, so it is filed as a per-project amount under AU-NSW (penalty_days_liquidated_damages_levied_mulwala_nsw) and cannot stand for Australia.
• Australian National Audit Office: Finance withheld liquidated damages for missing Practical Completion, then released them and waived more in a 2007 settlement, but the report states no amount. The contractor's extension-of-time claim (234.9 days, $46.89 million; Finance counted 89 days and $19.45 million) is one project's dispute, not a rate.
• Office of the Auditor General Western Australia: $209 000 of liquidated damages applied on one Western Australian building contract, against $789 000 of transitional costs; no contract value is given, so no share can be formed, and it is one state project.
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office: Shows liquidated damages exposure released in a settlement on one Victorian rail project (settlement 10.5 per cent of the original contract price), but states no amount accrued, so the damages themselves are unmeasured.
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office: Describes the liquidated damages regime (daily rates, capped at 10 per cent of target outturn cost, 15 per cent if the contractor raises the cap) on contracts not yet performed; a contract term, not damages levied.
• Productivity Commission: National inquiry on public infrastructure delivery; liquidated damages appear only in passing (a commentator's $15 million for one day late on one plant, a 10 per cent provision in one contract), with nothing on what is levied or on extension-of-time claims.
• Transport for NSW: Transport for NSW's general requirements TS 01566: the Principal's Authorised Person has no power over the liquidated damages only clause (clause 13.1(c), which cites Clause 51 of the General Conditions of Contract), and a subcontractor's liquidated damages may not exceed the rates agreed with the Principal (Primary Testing hold point); contract terms with no rate and no outcome.
• Hasib & Al-Kilidar (University of Technology Sydney): 28 respondents ranking 59 causes of delay; the paper does not mention damages, penalties or extensions of time, and measures no cost.
• Infrastructure Australia: National market-capacity study of risk allocation between government and contractors; the full text has no reference to liquidated damages or extensions of time.
• Arcadis with the Australian Constructors Association: Contractors' absorbed price escalation after variations and extensions of time; it names extensions of time as a mitigation tool but gives no count of claims refused or damages deducted, and no respondent count.

forfeited_entitlements/penalty_days_none_au · AU · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - a worked calculation gives 0.35% to 0.81% of contract value for 20 unclaimed wet days, but no source measures how many wet days a real job leaves unclaimed.

Sample. The calculation, not a measurement: 10% preliminaries x 45.49% time-related / 261 week days a year x 20 days = 0.35% of contract value; 20% x 45.49% / 226 working days x 20 days = 0.81%. 45.49% is O'Leary and Vaz-Serra table 6; 10% to 20% is their introduction, citing Chan and Pasquire 2002; 261, 226 and 20 are Transport for NSW TS 01566 Table E2.1. The time-related share of preliminaries comes from 30 senior Australian estimators; the working days and the 20 wet days are the ones Transport for NSW builds into its own daywork labour rate for major civil contracts.

What it is not. Recorded as `none` on purpose. A share of contract value is the one unit a product multiplies by a contract value, and this one rests on an assumed day count, so it is not held as a figure. See weather_wet_day_overhead for the same arithmetic as a cost per day. The 20 wet days a year that Transport for NSW estimates are priced into the rates, so their overhead is paid for; this is the cost of the same number of days going unclaimed beyond the allowance. How many unclaimed wet days a real job loses is not measured anywhere we found. The 10% to 20% preliminaries figure is a UK 2002 number read second-hand, and the estimators' survey was mostly building work. Use your own preliminaries rate and wet-day count if you have them.

Where it came from

• O'Leary & Vaz-Serra (2025), Challenges in pricing preliminaries costs for contractors: An Australian case study
  introduction citing Chan & Pasquire 2002; table 6 (30 Australian estimators) · source record
• Transport for NSW (2024), QA Specification TS 01566 (G2-C2): General Requirements (Major Contracts)
  Annexure G2-C2/E, Table E2.1, rows c, h and i · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'weather' is now the registers' cause 'penalty_days' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)
• 2026-11-02 subtype moved from 'penalty_days' to 'unclaimed_delay_costs' on SM070 P2 review: the figure measures time-related site overhead that keeps running on the days (extended preliminaries and site overheads), which is what the delay-costs cause covers, not liquidated damages running on time never claimed (the penalty_days cause)
• 2026-11-02 exposure_value 0.0035 (range 0.0035 to 0.0081, derivation calculated, unit ratio_of_contract) set to none before any tagged release, SM070: as a ratio of contract the worked example displaced the 10.6% variations figure on New South Wales jobs because its Transport for NSW source made it the nearest evidence, about 30 times lower on an assumed count of 20 unclaimed days. The arithmetic is kept in sample_note.

forfeited_entitlements/weather_unclaimed_days_share_of_contract · AU, AU-NSW · F, F42 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. AUD per working day at the high end (AU$870 at the low end), 20 wet days is AU$17,400 to AU$40,300.

Range A$870 to A$2,010 (scenario)

Sample. 30 senior Australian estimators put about 45.49% of preliminaries as time-related for the whole job; preliminaries are 10-20% of the contract sum. On a $5M job that is AU$870 to AU$2,010 per working day, depending on the overhead rate and the working days in the year.

What it is not. A WORKED EXAMPLE, NOT A MEASUREMENT. Both inputs are weaker than we would like: the 10-20% preliminaries figure is a UK 2002 number cited second-hand, and the estimators' survey was mostly building work. No open Australian civil source gives either number. Use your own rates if you have them. The unit is per wet day, so this figure is never multiplied by a contract value. Price year taken from the source's data year; not yet confirmed against the source's tables.

Our arithmetic. Worked on a $5M contract. High end: 5,000,000 x 20% preliminaries x 45.49% time-related = 454,900 a year, / 226 working days = 2,013, shown as 2,010. Low end: 5,000,000 x 10% x 45.49% = 227,450 a year, / 261 working days = 871, shown as 870. The 45.49% is table 6; the 10% to 20% is the introduction, citing Chan & Pasquire 2002.

Where it came from

• O'Leary & Vaz-Serra (2025), Challenges in pricing preliminaries costs for contractors: An Australian case study
  introduction citing Chan & Pasquire 2002; table 6 (30 Australian estimators) · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'weather' is now the registers' cause 'penalty_days' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)
• 2026-11-02 subtype moved from 'penalty_days' to 'unclaimed_delay_costs' on SM070 P2 review: the figure measures time-related site overhead per day (extended preliminaries and site overheads), which is what the delay-costs cause covers, not liquidated damages running on time never claimed (the penalty_days cause)

forfeited_entitlements/weather_wet_day_overhead · AU · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - New Zealand sources describe time bars on extension of time claims and name delay as a dispute cause, but none measures the money lost to unclaimed time or levied liquidated damages.

Sample. Search terms: New Zealand construction extension of time claims survey; liquidated damages New Zealand study rate per day percentage of contract; NZS 3910 time bars; construction weather delays New Zealand wet days cost; BRANZ NIWA weather delay construction; Civil Contractors NZ extreme weather survey. A frequency exists: respondents to the Treasury review report time bars of often 10 working days (Advisian 2019, Time bars section), and 20% of Russell McVeagh 2020 respondents expect delays and extensions of time to cause disputes; neither is a cost. Wet days are counted (NIWA 1991-2020, Auckland 130.1 a year) but not costed. The Civil Contractors NZ and Teletrac Navman 2023 survey (nearly 70% of businesses with projects hit by extreme weather, reported by RNZ) was seen only as press coverage and its report was not opened. The Treasury report is the source of record because it is the national New Zealand source that deals directly with time bars.

What it is not. Recorded as none on purpose: eight sources opened, none states what unclaimed time or levied liquidated damages cost a New Zealand contractor. A claim that a time bar caused a loss is the industry's complaint recorded in a review, not a measurement. Not read: the NZS 3910:2023 contract text, court decisions on liquidated damages, and any New Zealand Transport Agency data on liquidated damages levied.

Where it came from

• Advisian for the New Zealand Treasury Infrastructure Transactions Unit (2019), An examination of issues associated with the use of NZS Conditions of Contract
  executive summary (PDF p.3); "Time bars" (section 6, PDF p.24); "Risk transfer by stealth" (PDF p.30); NZIQS survey cited at PDF p.29 · source record

Considered and set aside

• Russell McVeagh: Perception survey: 20% of respondents expect delays and extensions of time to cause disputes and employer variation is the leading cause of delay. Shares of respondents, no money, no count of claims or liquidated damages.
• Building Disputes Tribunal (Te Taraipiunara Tautohe Hanga Whare): Lists extensions of time and liquidated damages claims among the common issues in adjudication but says it has not collected statistics on issue types; its published costs are for the dispute process, not the time claim.
• NIWA, republished by Figure.NZ: Mean annual wet days (1 mm or more) by station, 1991 to 2020, for example Auckland 130.1 and Christchurch 82.9. A count of days, not working days lost and not a cost; it does not say how many were claimed.
• Atapattu, Massey University (PhD thesis): Respondents rate unpredictable weather conditions 62% on a severity index (27th of 53 factors). A rating of importance; the 19.5% mean overrun across 106 road projects is not split by cause.
• Insurance Council of New Zealand: Insurer-reported claims from Cyclone Gabrielle (NZ$890 million, commercial NZ$352.5 million at March 2023). Insured property and business losses, not contractors' unrecovered delay costs or liquidated damages.
• New Zealand Infrastructure Commission / Te Waihanga: Benchmarks delivery cost against other countries and names delays and scope uncertainty as cost sources in general terms; no extension of time or liquidated damages data.
• Office of the Auditor-General: National audit of state highway maintenance contracts; reports on monitoring and the contract model and says nothing on extensions of time, weather days or liquidated damages.
• Mbachu and Taylor: Full text read (36 usable responses, mostly Wellington): ranks 21 contractual risks in six categories by mean significance; programme risk under required delivery timeframes ranks first overall, inclement weather 16th. Ratings, no money, and no liquidated damages or time-bar measure.

forfeited_entitlements/penalty_days_none_nz · NZ · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - New Zealand sources describe delay and extension of time disputes, but none gives a delay cost per day, a share of contract value, or the share of delay costs left unclaimed.

Sample. Search terms: New Zealand construction delay costs prolongation claims study; extension of time cost claims New Zealand survey; delay and disruption costs per day New Zealand; standby plant delay claim; preliminaries time-related New Zealand; Transmission Gully delay payments; Te Waihanga delay. A frequency exists: the Tribunal lists extensions of time and delay cost claims among the common issues in adjudication but has not collected statistics on types (printed pp.29-30 of its 2023 report). The Tribunal report is the source of record because it is the New Zealand national source that names delay cost claims as a routine adjudication issue and states it holds no figures for them. Reports of a NZ$190.6 million settlement with the Transmission Gully builder were seen in press only and cover one project.

What it is not. Recorded as none on purpose. A count of days is not a cost: no source gives money per delay day. The Australian per-day preliminaries figure in this corpus is Australian and is not carried across. Not read: the Waka Kotahi final account data, NZS 3910 commentary, and Transmission Gully settlement papers.

Where it came from

• Building Disputes Tribunal (Te Taraipiunara Tautohe Hanga Whare) (2023), Tracking the Trends: A report on statutory adjudication in Aotearoa New Zealand 2003-2023
  'Costs - How much does it cost?', 'Average costs all claims' table, pp.31-32 · source record

Considered and set aside

• Advisian for the New Zealand Treasury Infrastructure Transactions Unit: Reports time bars on variation and extension of time claims, often 10 working days; no delay cost amounts or counts.
• Russell McVeagh: Perception survey: employer variation and design problems are the commonest delay causes and 20% expect delays and extensions of time to cause disputes. Shares of respondents, no money.
• Atapattu, Massey University (PhD thesis): Delays in design rate 79% on a severity index (fourth of 53); contractual claims such as extensions of time with cost claims appear in only 8 articles of the literature review. Ratings and counts of papers, not costs.
• New Zealand Infrastructure Commission / Te Waihanga: Says delays and scope uncertainty raise costs in general terms; no delay cost per day or unclaimed amounts.
• Office of the Auditor-General: National audit of state highway maintenance contracts; reports on no delay claims.
• Mbachu and Taylor: Full text read (36 usable responses, mostly Wellington): ranks contractual risks by mean significance; no delay cost figure.
• Insurance Council of New Zealand: Insured claims from Cyclone Gabrielle (NZ$890 million at March 2023); it does not separate business interruption or contractors' standby costs.
• Adafin, Rotimi and Wilkinson: Cost plan against tender sum drift of 23.86% across 36 commercial projects supplied by the 64 project managers surveyed; pre-award estimating, not prolongation costs.

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What it is. None - New Zealand sources rank unforeseen ground conditions as a leading cost risk and say ground risk is transferred to contractors without reliance on reports, but none measures what it costs or how much goes unclaimed.

Sample. Search terms: New Zealand latent conditions claims; differing site conditions New Zealand contract; unforeseen ground conditions cost overrun New Zealand percentage; geotechnical risk allocation New Zealand; Transmission Gully ground conditions; NZS 3910 latent conditions; Te Waihanga geotechnical. A frequency exists: respondents to the Atapattu survey (92 completed responses) gave unforeseen ground conditions a severity index of 78%, sixth of 53 factors (Table 3.2); that is a rating of importance, not a cost. Press reports of ground surprises on single state highway projects were not opened. The Atapattu thesis is the source of record because it is the national New Zealand source with the most direct rating of unforeseen ground conditions, and its 106 road projects had a mean overrun of 19.5% that it does not split by cause.

What it is not. Recorded as none on purpose. The overrun of 19.5% on 106 New Zealand road projects covers every cause together and must not be read as the cost of ground conditions. Not read: tender-stage geotechnical baseline practice, NZS 3910 clause text, and claim files for ground conditions.

Where it came from

• Atapattu, Massey University (PhD thesis) (2023), A conceptual cost estimation model for the pre-design stage of road projects in New Zealand
  Chapter 3 survey, Table 3.2 (severity index by factor); chapter 4, Table 4.1 (106 road projects) · source record

Considered and set aside

• Advisian for the New Zealand Treasury Infrastructure Transactions Unit: Says ground risk is transferred to contractors by geotechnical reports issued without reliance clauses and that this has a cost, but gives no amount or count.
• Adafin, Rotimi and Wilkinson: Ranks site condition information among the top five risks to the gap between cost plan and tender sum (64 project managers). Pre-award estimating drift of 23.86% across 36 commercial projects, not claims on ground conditions.
• Roberts et al., New Zealand Geotechnical Society: NZGS paper saying unforeseen ground conditions cause cost over-runs; its evidence is a UK highways study and a UK table, not New Zealand data.
• New Zealand Infrastructure Commission / Te Waihanga: Says tunnelling in difficult ground can cost up to three times as much as in favourable ground and that further work is needed to quantify New Zealand's geological premium; no claim data.
• Mbachu and Taylor: Full text read (36 usable responses, mostly Wellington): site conditions are the most significant of six contractual risk categories (unforeseen site conditions mean 3.50, second of 21). A rating, no money.
• Building Disputes Tribunal (Te Taraipiunara Tautohe Hanga Whare): Does not list latent or differing site conditions among the common adjudication issues and has not collected issue-type statistics.
• Russell McVeagh: Dispute and delay causes reported by respondents do not include ground conditions as a category; no money.
• Office of the Auditor-General: National audit of state highway maintenance contracts; says nothing on ground conditions or claims.

forfeited_entitlements/unclaimed_latent_conditions_none_nz · NZ · F42 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - New Zealand sources say contractors go unpaid for variations because of time bars and name variations as a dispute cause, but none measures how often or how much.

Sample. Search terms: New Zealand construction variations unpaid study; variation claims time bar New Zealand; Waka Kotahi state highway contract variations percentage; contractors not paid for variations New Zealand; NZS 3910 variations survey; Auditor-General Transport Agency claims variations; Transmission Gully claims. A frequency exists: Advisian 2019 reports an industry view that contractors are not being paid for variations because of time bars (often 10 working days), and 13% of Russell McVeagh 2020 respondents expect variations to cause disputes; neither is a cost. Transmission Gully payments to the builder were seen in press only and are one project, so they were not opened as sources. The Treasury report is the source of record because it is the national New Zealand source that deals directly with variation time bars.

What it is not. Recorded as none on purpose. The time-bar complaint is the view of contractors and industry bodies reported in a government-commissioned review, which also gives the public sector's reason for time bars; it is not a measurement. Not read: the Waka Kotahi final account data (an Official Information Act request would be needed), NZS 3910 commentary, and court decisions on time-barred claims.

Where it came from

• Advisian for the New Zealand Treasury Infrastructure Transactions Unit (2019), An examination of issues associated with the use of NZS Conditions of Contract
  executive summary (PDF p.3); "Time bars" (section 6, PDF p.24); "Risk transfer by stealth" (PDF p.30); NZIQS survey cited at PDF p.29 · source record

Considered and set aside

• Russell McVeagh: Perception survey: employer variations are the leading cause of delay and 13% of respondents expect variations to cause disputes. Shares of respondents; no money or count of unpaid variations.
• Building Disputes Tribunal (Te Taraipiunara Tautohe Hanga Whare): Names claims for variations among the common issues in adjudication but says it has not collected statistics on issue types, so no count or value of variation claims.
• Atapattu, Massey University (PhD thesis): Rates variations and extra works 64% on a severity index (21st of 53). A rating of importance; the 19.5% mean overrun on 106 road projects is not split into variations or time-barred claims.
• Adafin, Rotimi and Wilkinson: Survey of 64 project managers on the gap between cost plan and tender sum (23.86% drift across 36 commercial projects). Pre-award estimating, not variations claimed or missed during a contract.
• Ramachandra and Rotimi, Auckland University of Technology: Of 40 High Court payment disputes 2008 to 2010, some concern variation claims, but the paper gives no split by issue and no value of variations unpaid.
• Raina, Auckland University of Technology (PhD thesis): Retention thesis; one subcontractor comment in Table 5.16 says negotiation losses on variations are a larger burden than retention, a single unquantified remark.
• Office of the Auditor-General: National audit of state highway maintenance contracts; does not report variations or claims.
• New Zealand Infrastructure Commission / Te Waihanga: Cites a California study that bids rise when scope later varies; no New Zealand variation data.
• Mbachu and Taylor: Full text read (36 usable responses, mostly Wellington): ranks contractual risks by mean significance. No money and no variation measure.

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What it is. None - New Zealand sources count how often payment is delayed or lost, and the 2014 MBIE impact statement estimates NZ$7 to 16 million of retentions written off a year against NZ$150 to 250 million held, but no source measures a share of contract value or of the amount claimed that is never paid, and the corpus has no denominator for a share of retention held.

Sample. Search terms: MBIE regulatory impact statement retention money Construction Contracts Act; KPMG implementation review retention money; New Zealand retention lost insolvency subcontractors; payment delays losses New Zealand construction survey; Ramachandra Rotimi payment; liquidation unsecured creditors dividend construction New Zealand; BDO construction survey retentions; adjudication default liability New Zealand. Frequencies exist, none a cost: 40% of 40 High Court payment cases ended with the claimant paid in full but late and 25% with a loss (Ramachandra and Rotimi 2011, Table 3); 12 of 16 liquidated trade-service firms paid trade creditors nothing; respondents say payment delays or losses touched 10 to 40% of contractors' and 10 to 80% of subcontractors' projects (2012 abstract); 15% of Tribunal adjudications rest on default liability. The BDO 2018 and 2019 survey reports were not found as PDFs and press coverage of them was not used. Of the two retention measures found, the 2014 MBIE estimate of annual write-offs is the closer to a loss, but it is a share of retentions held and the schema has no such denominator; Ramachandra and Rotimi 2011 is the source of record because it is the New Zealand national source read that records actual outcomes of unpaid construction payments in liquidation and court.

What it is not. Recorded as none on purpose. The liquidation records are 65 companies and the court records 40 cases, with outcomes classified by the authors; the payment loss is counted in cases, not in dollars of contract value. Retention held is not retention lost, and the 2020 MBIE benefits are a model. The 2014 MBIE write-off estimate is real survey data but is a share of retention held, so it cannot be filed until the schema has a retention-held denominator. Not read: the BDO 2018 and 2019 survey reports, the Mainzeal and Ebert liquidators' reports, and Companies Office insolvency statistics.

Where it came from

• Ramachandra and Rotimi, Auckland University of Technology (2011), The nature of payment problems in the New Zealand construction industry
  Table 1 (65 liquidated construction companies), the liquidation outcomes paragraphs, Table 2 and Table 3 (40 High Court payment disputes, 2008 to 2010) · source record

Considered and set aside

• Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: Gives retention as 2 to 10 per cent of contract price and modelled benefits ($88.9m financing, $7.6m insolvency a year) taken from a New South Wales analysis; modelled, not observed losses.
• Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: Repeats retention of commonly 2% to 10% of contract value and the modelled $50 to $100 million benefit; a typical range held, not a share lost.
• Raina, Auckland University of Technology (PhD thesis): Survey of 187: retention is lost altogether sometimes or rarely for most subcontractors (Figure 5.8). Table 5.16 has subcontractors' own retention held and overdue, which the thesis adds to NZ$6,603,422 overdue. It is overdue, not lost (some rows are, and say so), self-reported, from a low-response self-selected set; the table also gives retention held, so overdue is roughly a third of it, but that is lateness of a held sum, not a loss, and has no denominator in the corpus.
• Ramachandra and Rotimi, Auckland University of Technology: Importance ratings of causes of payment problems from 115 practitioners; no amounts.
• Ramachandra and Rotimi, Auckland University of Technology: Full text read (263 of 1,600 invited responded): respondents report payment delays or losses on 10 to 40% of contractors' and 10 to 80% of subcontractors' projects (Figure 1); a share of projects, not of money.
• Department of Building and Housing: About residential consumer disputes and dispute resolution fees; no figures on unpaid claims or retention.
• Building Disputes Tribunal (Te Taraipiunara Tautohe Hanga Whare): One tribunal: 15% of adjudications are brought solely on default liability (no payment schedule or unpaid scheduled amount) and 14% face jurisdictional challenges; the costs it reports are of the process, not of unpaid money.
• Russell McVeagh: 19% of respondents expect financial issues (slow payment, solvency) to cause disputes; shares of respondents, no money.
• Advisian for the New Zealand Treasury Infrastructure Transactions Unit: Calls for consistent retention and bonding terms across public contracts; no amounts.
• Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: The nearest to a measured loss: from an October 2014 MBIE survey of the commercial construction sector (125 usable responses, about 13 per cent of the market) it estimates NZ$150 to 250 million of retentions held and NZ$7 to 16 million written off a year, 40 per cent of payees writing off 5 per cent or more of their retentions. MBIE itself flags significant uncertainty from survey design and extrapolation. It is a share of retention held, a denominator the finding schema does not offer, and it covers commercial building, not civil work, so it is not filed.
• KPMG for the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: Implementation review of the retention regime (71 of 223 firms responded). Gives case amounts only: NZ$4.47 million of post-regime retentions withheld at the Ebert receivership, of which subcontractors holding NZ$856,141 had no interest in the trust account, and about NZ$8.35 million in retention accounts across four insolvencies. It says the larger insolvency loss is the one to two months of unpaid claims and work in progress, with no amount.

forfeited_entitlements/unpaid_claims_none_nz · NZ · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. 4.9% of contract value, held until the defects liability period ends.

Sample. 419 clients and 508 contractors surveyed, UK, all construction. Retention was not received back at all after the defects liability period on 5% of tier-1, 10.8% of tier-2 and 13.1% of tier-3 contracts.

What it is not. The money is held, not lost, until it is not returned. UK data from 2017 with no comparable Australian study; the authors say some tier differences are not statistically robust.

Where it came from

• Pye Tait Consulting for BEIS (2017), Retentions in the Construction Industry
  executive summary; table p.92 · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'closeout' is now the registers' cause 'unpaid_claims' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)

forfeited_entitlements/entitlement_retention_held · GB · F ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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What it is. None - the only share-of-cost figures found are a single residential project and a perception survey.

Sample. UK national weather data and standard building activities; a model with a worked example, not observed projects. Found UK weather extends durations by an average of 21%.

What it is not. Recorded as `none` on purpose. The research pass found only two cost-as-percent figures: 4% on one Sydney apartment project (sponsored content, residential) and 23.8% from a Pakistani perception survey the pass called implausible. Neither is a benchmark, so this register holds no ratio rather than a convenient one. See weather_wet_day_overhead for what IS measured.

Where it came from

• Ballesteros-Perez, Smith, Lloyd-Papworth & Cooke (2018), Incorporating the effect of weather in construction scheduling and management with sine wave curves
  abstract · source record

History

• 2026-11-02 subtype 'weather' is now the registers' cause 'penalty_days' (schema 3.0.0, SM070)
• 2026-11-02 subtype moved from 'penalty_days' to 'unclaimed_delay_costs' on SM070 P2 review: the figure measures the cost of weather as a share of contract value (delay money, not time owed), which is what the delay-costs cause covers, not liquidated damages running on time never claimed (the penalty_days cause)

forfeited_entitlements/weather_market_ratio_none · GB · F41 ·the record ·link to this figure ·dispute this figure(or email support@demiton.io)

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